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Abstract
Photo Response Non Uniformity (PRNU) is considered the most effective trace for the image source
attribution task. Its uniqueness ensures that the sensor pattern noises extracted from different cameras
are strongly uncorrelated, even when they belong to the same camera model. However, with the advent of
computational photography, most recent devices of the same model start exposing correlated patterns thus
introducing the real chance of erroneous image source attribution. In this paper, after highlighting the
issue under a controlled environment, we perform a large testing campaign on Flickr images to determine
how widespread the issue is and which is the plausible cause. To this aim, we tested over 240000 image
pairs from 54 recent smartphone models comprising the most relevant brands. Experiments show that
many Samsung, Xiaomi and Huawei devices are strongly affected by this issue. Although the primary
cause of high false alarm rates cannot be directly related to specific camera models, firmware nor image
contents, it is evident that the effectiveness of PRNU-based source identification on the most recent
devices must be reconsidered in light of these results. Therefore, this paper is to be intended as a call to
action for the scientific community rather than a complete treatment of the subject.
1 Introduction
Photo Response Non Uniformity (PRNU) is considered the most distinctive trace to link an image to its
originating device [1]. Such a trace has been studied and improved for more than a decade and can be used
for several tasks: (i) attribute an image to its source camera [2]; (ii) determine whether two images belong to
the same camera [3]; (iii) cluster a large amount of images based on the originating device [4]; (iv) determine
whether an image and a video have been captured with the same camera [5]; (v) detect and localize the
presence of a manipulated image region [2].
After its introduction [1], several refinements were introduced to improve the usage of the PRNU trace
under challenging scenarios. Non-unique artifacts introduced by color interpolation and JPEG compression
were studied and removed [2]; a more general approach was proposed to manage the case of cropped and
resized images and the peak-to-correlation-energy (PCE) metric was introduced as a more robust way to
measure the peak value of the correlation [6], [7]; several filters and preprocessing steps have been proposed
to further improve its effectiveness and efficiency [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]; PRNU compression techniques have
been developed to enable very large scales operations [13], [14], previously impossible due to the size of the
PRNU and to the complexity of the matching operations. Such a trace has also been studied under more
complicated setups, e.g. when the media is exchanged through a social media [15], or when it is acquired
with the digital zoom [6].
All the mentioned works have been carried out under rather controlled scenarios, where the images
used in the experiments were taken by camera devices or smartphones that follow the standard acquisition
pipeline [16].
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The first step towards more modern acquisition devices have been represented by the study of PRNU
detection in presence of Electronic Image Stabilization (EIS); EIS introduces a pixel grid misalignment that,
if not taken into account, leads PRNU based testing to failure [17] [18]. Anyhow, the PRNU effectiveness
has been never put in doubt since, in all the above scenarios, the main risk was related to the increase of the
missing detection rate only (i.e. the source camera is not identified), whereas the false alarm rate (i.e. the
image is attributed to a wrong source camera) has always been negligible.
With the advent of computational photography, even more new challenges appear since the image ac-
quisition pipeline is rapidly changing, and it appears to be strongly customized by each brand: the main
novelties include the design of pixel binning [19], [20] and of customized HDR algorithms [21] in the image
acquisition process; the exploitation of artificial intelligence for the application of customized filters [22] in
the in-camera processing step.
These new customized pipelines can possibly introduce new non-unique artifacts, shared among different
cameras of the same models, or even among cameras of different models, that could disturb the PRNU
extraction process and thus pose the serious risk that images belonging to different cameras expose correlated
pattern, thus increasing in an unexpected way the false alarm rate in PRNU detection. This is a very serious
issue since PRNU based source identification is currently used as evidence in court 1 and is implemented in
several forensic software supplied to law enforcement agencies and intelligence services, like PRNU Compare
Professional software 2 developed by the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI), and Amped Authenticate3
from Amped Software.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the first study where the PRNU-based source identifi-
cation is tested under a large set of images taken by the most recent devices that exploit the newest imaging
technologies. In particular, we will highlight that this forensic technique, applied as it is on modern cameras,
is not reliable anymore since it is strongly affected by unexpected high correlations among different devices
of the same smartphone model and/or brand. Considering that PRNU-based source camera identification
is currently used by law enforcement agencies worldwide, often to investigate serious crimes such as child
sexual exploitation, we believe it is fundamental that the scientific community cross-verifies the results we
obtained (all datasets presented in the paper are made available) and tries to shed light on this potentially
disruptive discovery as promptly as possible.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the theoretical framework and the main pipeline for
the PRNU extraction and comparison is summarized; in Section 3 the collected images and cameras are
described; in Section 4 the state-of-the-art performance are verified on the currently available benchmark
datasets. Fingerprints collision analysis is reported in Section 5: we highlight that high values of correlation
can be found on some very recent smartphone cameras; then, we assess how widespread the problem is by
performing large scale test on Flickr images. Section 6 highlights the achieved conclusions.
Everywhere in this paper vectors and matrices are indicated in bold as X and their components as X(i)
and X(i, j) respectively. All operations are element-wise, unless mentioned otherwise. Given two vectors X
and Y, ||X|| is the euclidean norm of X, X ·Y is the dot product between X and Y, X¯ is the mean value of
X, ρ(s1, s2;X,Y) is the normalized cross-correlation between X and Y calculated at the spatial shift (s1, s2)
as
ρ(s1, s2;X,Y) =
∑
i
∑
j(X[i, j]− X¯)(Y[i+ s1, j + s2]− Y¯)
||X− X¯||||Y − Y¯|| ,
where the shifts [i, j] and [i + s1, j + s2] are taken modulo the horizontal and vertical image dimensions
4.
Furthermore, we denote maximum by ρ(speak;X,Y) = max
s1,s2
ρ(s1, s2;X,Y). The notations are simplified in
ρ(s) and in ρ(speak) when the two vectors cannot be misinterpreted.
2 PRNU based source identification
PRNU defines a subtle variation among pixels amplitude due to the different sensitivity to light of the
sensor’s elements. This defect introduces a unique fingerprint onto every image the camera takes. Then,
1(United States of America v Nathan Allen Railey, United States District Court: Southern District of Alabama: 1:10-cr-
00266-CG-N, 2011)
2https://www.forensicinstitute.nl/products-and-services/forensic-products
3https://ampedsoftware.com/authenticate
4If X and Y dimensions mismatch, a zero down-right padding is applied.
2
camera fingerprints can be estimated and compared among images to determine the originating device. The
camera fingerprint is usually estimated from n images I1, . . . , In as follows: a denoising filter [1], [23] is
applied to the images to obtain the noise residuals W1, . . . ,Wn; the reference camera fingerprint estimate
K˜ is derived by the maximum likelihood estimator [2]:
K˜ =
∑N
i=1WiIi∑N
i=1 I
2
i
. (1)
Two further processing are applied to K˜ to remove demosaicing traces, JPEG blocking and other non-unique
artifacts [2].
The most common source identification test tries to determine whether a query image I belongs to a
specific camera. Given W the noise residual extracted from I and the reference camera fingerprint estimate
K˜, the two-dimensional normalized cross-correlation ρ(s1, s2;X,Y) is computed with X = IK˜,Y = W for
any plausible shift (s1, s2); then the peak-to-correlation energy (PCE) ratio [7] is derived as
PCE =
ρ(speak)
2
1
mn−|V|
∑
s/∈V
ρ(s)2
(2)
where V is a small set of peak neighbours and (m,n) is the image pixel resolution. When PCE > τ , for a
given threshold τ , we decide that W is found within I, i.e. the image belongs to the reference camera. A
threshold of 60 is commonly accepted by the research community since it guarantees a negligible false alarm
rate (FAR) [7], [17]. [24], [18].
When multiple query images are available from the same camera, a query fingerprint K˜Q can be estimated
(through Eq. 1) and the test can be performed by using X = K˜Q and Y = K˜. This test is preferable since
it allows suppressing most of the image content on both reference and query side. However, multiple query
images from the same camera may not be available in practical cases.
The above test can be also applied to determine whether two images belong to the same camera, in order
to perform a device linking. In this case the query and reference fingerprints are simply estimated by a single
image. In device linking it is expected to expose a higher missing detection rate (MDR) since the strength of
PRNU on a single image can be negligible and strongly contaminated by image content. However, the FAR
is still negligible (see Section 4 for more details).
In the next section we will show that fingerprints estimated from different devices exhibit unexpected
high correlations on most recent devices.
3 Data collection
In order to understand the impact of the technological novelties in the imaging field on the PRNU detection,
we considered three independent datasets:
• VISION dataset [15], used as benchmark to verify the effectiveness of the source identification task;
VISION is currently the most adopted dataset for the assessment of the current image forensics al-
gorithms. It includes images acquired by 35 devices belonging to 11 different brands: Apple, Asus,
Huawei, Lenovo, LG electronics, Microsoft, OnePlus, Samsung, Sony, Wiko, and Xiaomi. It is worth to
note that all these devices have been released on or before 2016, so their imaging technology is starting
to be obsolete. For each device, there are at least 60 flat images representing flat surfaces (e.g., skies
or walls) and 130 natural images representing generic scenes.
• Control dataset: it is a collection of images acquired from 23 more recent smartphones, including 17
different models belonging to the brands Huawei, Xiaomi, Samsung and Apple. As shown in Table 1,
each device is uniquely identified with an ID, since for some models we collected more than one device.
For each smartphone 5 flat images and 10 natural images were collected. In this case, these devices
have been released after 2018, with the only exception of Apple iPhone X and Huawei P10, presented
in 2017; in any case, all these models are more recent than the ones in VISION.
• Flickr dataset: we collected Flickr images from the same models considered in the Control dataset,
plus 31 other camera models chosen among the most widespread in the market5 (see Table 2). For
5based on statistics found on https://www.statista.com/
3
Table 1: List of devices belonging to the Control Dataset.
ID Brand Model
C01 Huawei P Smart 2019
C02 Huawei P Smart 2019
C03 Huawei P20 pro
C04 Huawei P20 pro
C05 Huawei P20 pro
C06 Huawei P30 lite
C07 Huawei P20 lite
C08 Huawei P20 lite
C09 Huawei P10
C10 Xiaomi Mi A3
C11 Xiaomi Mi Note 10
C12 Xiaomi Redmi Note 8T
C13 Samsung A70
C14 Samsung S10e
C15 Samsung S6
C16 Samsung S9
C17 Samsung S9+
C18 OnePlus 6
C19 OnePlus 6T
C20 Apple iPhone 11
C21 Apple iPhone 11
C22 Apple iPhone 11 Pro Max
C23 Apple iPhone X
each targeted device model, we selected and downloaded 100 images (or less, when such number was
not available) ensuring they met the following constraints:
1. Exif Make and Model metadata were present and matched the targeted device;
2. image resolution matched the maximum resolution allowed by the device. For some devices,
especially those featuring pixel binning, more than one resolution was selected for download. In
such cases, 100 images were dowloaded for each resolution;
3. image metadata did not contain traces of processing software. To achieve this, we checked the
Exif software tag against a blacklist of over 90 image processing software;
4. no more than 10 images from the same Flickr user were downloaded. This was an upper bound,
however, in most cases the abundance of available images allowed selecting pictures from tens of
different users.
Eventually, we collected 6719 flickr images. Let us highlight that, while in the Control dataset each ID
represents a specific exemplar, in the Flickr dataset we gathered images belonging to multiple exemplars for
each model, corresponding to the number of users indicated in Table 2. Images belonging to Control and
Flickr datasets will be made available to researchers upon request to the corresponding author.
4 Performance on benchmark dataset
Given a good reference fingerprint, an image can be effectively linked to its originating device. This fact is
already highlighted in [15] where Shullani et al. show that when a good reference is available, the source
identification task on a single image can be achieved with great accuracy. Indeed, tests on native contents
from the VISION Dataset produce an Area Under Curve (AUC) of 0.99. Thanks to these results and to
similar experiments carried out in other datasets, forensic experts, law enforcement agencies and the research
community agree on the effectiveness of the source identification task. More specifically, a false positive is
expected to be a very rare event, thus assuring that a high PCE value represents a very strong and reliable
finding.
It’s worth noticing that good performance can be achieved even in device linking, when only two images
are compared. To demonstrate this fact, we randomly selected 20 natural images per each VISION device,
and we computed the PCE between fingerprints estimated from single images, thus obtaining 6650 matching
image pairs and 238000 mismatching image pairs. In Fig. 1 the achieved PCE statistics are reported in
boxplot form for each device. Matching and mismatching cases are reported in green and red respectively.
When the commonly agreed threshold of 60 is exploited to determine whether two images belong to the same
device, only 30 mismatching couples overcome the threshold. As expected, the method then assures a low
4
Table 2: List of tested camera models composing the Flickr dataset. In bold, we highlight the camera models
also present in the control dataset. For each model, the number of collected images from the given number
of Flickr users is shown. In case of devices for which multiple resolutions were considered, both images with
maximum resolution (first number) and with lower resolution (second number) are indicated.
Brand Model Images Users
Huawei Honor View 20 38+14 8+4
Huawei Mate 20 Lite 100 53
Huawei Mate 20 Pro 100+100+100 53+51+34
Huawei P Smart 2019 100 36
Huawei P20 pro 100+32 26+13
Huawei P30 100+100 45+31
Huawei P30 lite 100+82 61+32
Huawei P30 pro 100+100 62+36
Huawei P20 lite 100 58
Huawei P10 100+100 51+46
Xiaomi Mi 9 100+100 44+36
Xiaomi Mi A3 100+44 45+13
Xiaomi Mi Note 10 78+100 24+30
Xiaomi Redmi Note 7 100+100 48+46
Xiaomi Redmi Note 8T 100+100 26+30
Samsung A10e 100 34
Samsung A20 100 38
Samsung A40 100 53
Samsung A50 100 37
Samsung A70 100+100 46+24
Samsung J2 100 28
Samsung J4 48 7
Samsung S10 100+100 50+35
Samsung S10+ 100+100 55+42
Samsung S10e 100+100 47+43
Samsung S20 Ultra 78+100 22+25
Samsung S20+ 55+13 10+4
Samsung S6 100 84
Samsung S7 100 58
Samsung S7 Edge 100 82
Samsung S8 100 60
Samsung S8+ 100 56
Samsung S9 100 68
Samsung S9+ 100 52
OnePlus 6 100 55
OnePlus 6T 100 46
Oppo A5 2020 83 15
Oppo A9 2020 100 26
Realme C2 54 17
Motorola E5 Play 100 40
Nokia PureView808 100 52
Apple iPhone 11 100 58
Apple iPhone 11 Pro 100 60
Apple iPhone 11 Pro Max 100 65
Apple iPhone 6 100 98
Apple iPhone 6 Plus 100 91
Apple iPhone 7 100 92
Apple iPhone 7 Plus 100 93
Apple iPhone 8 100 93
Apple iPhone 8 Plus 100 85
Apple iPhone X 100 90
Apple iPhone XR 100 81
Apple iPhone XS 100 73
Apple iPhone XS Max 100 79
(≤ 0.001) false alarm rate even when single images are compared. Furthermore, if we consider a more careful
threshold of 100, false positives completely disappear.
In the next section we apply the same scheme on images belonging to the Control dataset.
5 Fingerprints collision
For each device of the Control dataset we estimated the camera fingerprint from 5 flat images, and we
computed the PCE among all fingerprint couples. In Fig. 2 we report the achieved PCE values in a confusion
matrix. Since the fingerprints belong to different sensors, we expect that all achieved peaks are below 60.
Surprisingly, we obtained high PCE values among the three available Huawei P20 Pro and among the Samsung
S9, the Samsung S9+ and the Samsung S10e. These results highlight that unexpected high correlation can
happen among different cameras of the same model (Huawei P20 Pro) and among different camera models of
5
Figure 1: PCE statistics computed between couple of images from VISION devices. Matching and mismatch-
ing couples are reported in green and red respectively. The threshold of 60 is highlighted by the red dotted
line.
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Figure 2: PCE statistics computed among different camera fingerprints in the Control dataset.
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Table 3: List of devices in the Flickr dataset having a FPR greater than 0.5%. Only the resolution obtaining
highest FPR is reported.
Brand Model FPR
Xiaomi Mi Note 10 22.77%
Samsung Galaxy S20 Ultra 21.37%
Samsung Galaxy S10+ 20.23%
Samsung Galaxy S10 15.91%
Samsung Galaxy S10e 14.06%
Samsung Galaxy A50 12.06%
Samsung Galaxy A70 11.92%
Xiaomi Mi 9 10.98%
Samsung Galaxy S20 Ultra 9.66%
Samsung Galaxy J4 Core 7.38%
Samsung Galaxy S20+ 6.65%
Nokia PureView 808 3.24%
Samsung Galaxy A70 1.92%
Xiaomi Mi Note 10 1.83%
Samsung Galaxy S20+ 1.79%
Huawei P30 Pro 1.32%
Huawei P20 Pro 0.87%
Huawei Mate 20 Pro 0.76%
Xiaomi Redmi Note 7 0.66%
Xiaomi Mi 9 0.62%
Huawei P10 0.54%
Xiaomi Redmi Note 8T 0.53%
the same brand (Samsung). Furthermore, collisions were found by using only 5 flat images per device. In the
next Section we perform an exhaustive campaign on Flickr images to determine, among the most widespread
smartphones, which are affected by this issue.
5.1 Results on Flickr Dataset
The above results pose serious doubts on the applicability of the source identification as it is on modern
devices. In order to confirm these results, we applied the comparison among image couples on the Flickr
dataset. Tests were performed with the following criteria:
• the positive class includes image couples belonging to the same model and the same Flickr user id;
• the negative class includes image couples belonging to the same model and different Flickr user id;
• for each device we tested different resolutions separately without applying any resampling operation;
• we compared each couple of fingerprints at their native orientation and rotating by 180◦ one of them
(90◦ and 270◦ rotations were tested in case one of the fingerprints originated from a portrait-oriented
image).
In Figures 3 and 4, we report PCE statistics computed between couple of images split per device (one
boxplot each). The threshold of 60 is highlighted by the red dashed line. As shown in the top of Figure 3,
Apple phones do not seem to be affected by the issue (the total False Positive Rate, FPR, is 0.12%, which is
coherent with what observed on the VISION dataset). On Huawei devices (middle of Figure 3) the issue is
less negligible with a FPR of 0.84%, spread on several devices. The fingerprints collision becomes extremely
evident on many Samsung (Figure 3, bottom) and Xiaomi (Figure 4, top) devices, with a global FAR of
13.6% and 7.0% respectively. Among other devices, the less recent Nokia PureView 808 is also affected by
the issue (Figure 4, bottom) with a FPR of 6.8%. In Table 3 we list the devices for which a FPR greater
than 0.5% was observed.
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Figure 3: PCE statistics computed between couple of images from Apple (top), Huawei (middle), and
Samsung (bottom) devices. Matching and mismatching couples are reported in green and red respectively.
The threshold of 60 is highlighted by the red dashed line.
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Figure 4: PCE statistics computed between couple of images from Xiaomi and other devices. Matching and
mismatching couples are reported in green and red respectively. The threshold of 60 is highlighted by the
red dotted line.
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5.2 Discussion
The results presented in the previous sections deserve some comments. Firstly, false positives are not in-
dependent on the resolution settings: the Galaxy S20 Ultra, for example, suffers from false positives at the
12MP binned resolution, but not at the maximum resolution. Similarly, false positives are found on the
Samsung Galaxy S10+ at 12MP but not at 16MP . Noticeably, results do not allow establishing am appar-
ent link between false positives and devices featuring the pixel binning technique; for example, the Redmi
Note 8T model features such technique but has a low false positive rate, while the Samsung Galaxy S10
does not use pixel binning but is strongly affected by false positives. Finally and remarkably, some devices,
e.g. the Samsung Galaxy S9, yield false positives in the Control dataset (see Figure 2) but not in the Flickr
dataset (bottom of Figure 3). Even comparing image metadata (e.g. firmware version, picture acquisition
date, camera settings) we could not find an explanation for this fact, which remains an open question. The
existence of devices (e.g., the Samsung Galaxy S9) whose fingerprint uniqueness is questionable in the Control
dataset but seems not questionable in the Flickr dataset is worrying, as it suggests that, when working on a
real investigation, even obtaining images from many exemplars of the same camera model could not suffice
to compute a reliable threshold with the classical Neyman-Pearson approach.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have conducted a large scale validation of the classical PRNU-based source camera identifi-
cation on a dataset of modern devices, with a particular focus on image-vs-image matching. After ensuring,
using the well-known VISION dataset, that the image-vs-image noise residual comparison was a meaningful
test, we repeated the experiment both on the Control dataset, containing 23 devices, and on a dataset ob-
tained from Flickr, containing 54 devices. Results show that fingeprint uniqueness is not guaranteed for many
device models: for the widely adopted PCE threshold of 60, false positive rates larger than 1% were observed
for popular devices belonging to Huawei, Samsung, Nokia, and Xiaomi. Based on our results, instead, recent
Apple devices seem not affected, their results being totally in line with those observed on the older VISION
dataset.
After examining and discussing results, we believe this papers opens two fundamental problems: 1)
understanding if there is a single discriminating element which hinders fingerprint uniqueness for some models;
2) devising a general test that, starting from some images of an investigated device, tells whether PRNU
source identification can be considered reliable for that specific device. In the scope of this paper, we were
not able to answer the above questions in general, but we were able to reasonably exclude some possible
explanations, such as pixel binning.
Considering the widespread, worldwide application of PRNU-based source identification by law enforce-
ment agencies, we believe it is of paramount importance to shed light on the issues raised in this paper.
Therefore, this paper is to be intended as a call to action for the scientific community, which is invited to
reproduce and validate our results and answer the questions that remained open.
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